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Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The 
Patenting of Geoengineering Inventions 
By Anthony E. Chavez* 
We will not be able to curtail greenhouse-gas emissions quickly enough to avoid 
significant climate change. Thus, we should anticipate that society will consider 
implementing climate engineering, either to avert a climate catastrophe or to reduce 
atmospheric carbon. Although geoengineering research is still in its infancy, in recent 
years the number of geoengineering patents and patent applications has increased 
dramatically. Because of the importance of these technologies to society’s future, the 
United States needs to ensure that these patents do not deter innovation or prevent these 
technologies from being available for implementation. Specifically, the United States 
should develop unique procedures to approve these applications and form a 
geoengineering patent pool that will facilitate both innovation and accessibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  The Fifth Assessment Report of the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change warns that the planet is rapidly reaching a dangerous level of warming.1 
Furthermore, it reports that much of the carbon dioxide causing this warming will remain 
in the atmosphere for a millennium.2 Many scientists have urged studying geoengineering 
as a means to avert a climate emergency or to reduce the level of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
Some have begun researching climate-engineering methods and have patented their 
inventions. 
¶2  Over the past five years, the number of climate-engineering patents has 
skyrocketed. The patent system, however, may not be ready for the implications of this 
wave of new applications and may in fact hinder the development of these technologies. 
Already, one company has cancelled testing of a geoengineering method because of a 
dispute over a patent.3 One leading advocate of climate engineering argues for a 
categorical ban of geoengineering patents altogether.4  
¶3  This Article explores the patenting of geoengineering inventions and its potential 
impact. To place this issue in its appropriate context, Section II reviews the current and 
future state of the global climate and discusses the basics of geoengineering. Section III 
explores the current trends in geoengineering patents. Section IV reviews methods used 
previously to ameliorate problems with the patent system. Finally, Section V proposes an 
approach to address the concerns raised by geoengineering patents.  
II. UNAVOIDABLE AND LONG-LASTING CLIMATE CHANGE WILL NECESSITATE 
CONSIDERATION FOR CLIMATE ENGINEERING 
¶4  Dangerous climate change is unavoidable. Structural barriers will prevent a quick 
reduction in greenhouse emissions. The resulting delay will ensure that warming will 
have severe consequences. Even worse, the long lifespan of atmospheric carbon will keep 
 
1 Todd Sanford et al., The Climate Policy Narrative for a Dangerously Warming World, 4 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 164, 164 (2014). Present emissions exceed the Fifth Assessment Report’s highest 
Representative Concentration Pathway, in which total emissions exceed the 2°C budget by mid-century. Id. 
The 2°C rise had been the level at which avoiding dangerous climate change could be avoided, but many 
now believe that level should be set at 1.5°C. Id.  
2 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 472 (2013) [hereinafter IPCC]. 
3 Daniel Cressey, Cancelled Project Spurs Debate over Geoengineering Patents, 485 NATURE 429, 429 
(2012). 
4 Anne C. Mulkern, Researcher: Ban Patents on Geoengineering Technology, SCI. AM. (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/researcher-ban-patents-on-geoengineering-technology/. 
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the global temperature at its new level for a millennium. Mitigation alone cannot avert 
these consequences. As a result, we need to consider climate-engineering methods to 
reduce the level of carbon in the atmosphere to avoid a climate catastrophe. 
A. Significant Climate Change Is Becoming Unavoidable 
¶5  The global scientific community agrees that we must hold global warming below 
2°C to avoid “dangerous climate change.”5 This goal, however, is now “patently 
unrealistic.”6 Even more troubling, scientists now project the effects of a 2°C rise to be 
worse than anticipated, identifying such an increase as “dangerous” or “extremely 
dangerous” climate change.7 
¶6  Indeed, the National Research Council (NRC) recently reported that the earth is 
warming so quickly that abrupt and unpredictable consequences are foreseeable in a few 
decades, or worse, maybe just a few years.8 In its December 2013 report, the NRC 
analyzed the likelihood of “abrupt climate changes” occurring in the near future.9 The 
report concluded that the effects of climate change have already begun,10 and that more 
can be anticipated.11 Furthermore, the risk of reaching various “tipping points”12 has 
increased markedly.13 Indeed, months later, two groups of scientists concluded that a 
large portion of the West Antarctic ice sheet has begun an irreversible collapse,14 which 
will eventually raise global sea levels by several feet.15 
B. The Rise in the Planet’s Temperature Will Continue and Last for Centuries 
¶7  Although we can already project that global temperatures will reach dangerous 
levels, we can also anticipate that, regardless of what steps we take now, warming will 
continue in the near term. Furthermore, global temperatures will remain at their new 
 
5 Wil Burns, Introduction: Climate Change Geoengineering, 7 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 87, 87 
(2013) (internal citations omitted). 
6 Id. Indeed, a United Nations report notes that current emission trends and commitments project 
warming reaching 3.5°C to 5°C by 2100. WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT 1 (2013). 
7 Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows, Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New 
World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 20, 23 (2011). 
8 Tony Barboza, Studies Warn of Abrupt Environmental Effects of Warming, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/03/local/la-me-climate-urgency-20131204 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ANTICIPATING SURPRISES (2013), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18373). 
9 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 21. The report identifies “abrupt climate changes” as 
“abrupt changes in the physical climate system.”Id. at 2.  
10 Id. at 3. These changes include the disappearance of late-summer Arctic sea ice and increases in 
extinction rates. Id. 
11 Id. at 14–17 (identifying the following as abrupt changes with a moderate likelihood of occurring this 
century: decrease in ocean oxygen, increase in heat waves, increase in precipitation events, and rapid 
changes in ecosystems and species habitats). 
12 “Tipping points” are thresholds beyond which major and rapid changes occur when crossed. Id. at vii. 
13 Barboza, supra note 8. 
14 Ian Joughlin, Benjamin E. Smith & Brooke Medley, Marine Ice Sheet Collapse Potentially Under 
Way for the Thwaites Glacier Basin, West Antarctica, SCIENCE, May 16, 2014, at 735, 738. 
15 E. Rignot et al., Widespread, Rapid Grounding Line Retreat of Pine Island, Thwaites, Smith, and 
Kohler Glaciers, West Antarctica, from 1992 to 2011, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 3502, 3502 (2014). 
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levels for centuries. This will occur for a number of reasons, including both an inability 
to reduce emissions rapidly and the long atmospheric life of carbon.  
¶8  As noted previously, current commitments to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions 
contemplate continued emissions.16 Scientists have concluded, however, that the eventual 
increase in peak warming is equivalent to the increase in total emissions. For instance, an 
annual increase in cumulative CO2 emissions of 0.5% will lead to a comparable increase 
in peak-committed warming of approximately 0.5%.17 Consequently, if society delays 
reducing emissions for ten years, such a delay would cause peak warming to be 5% 
higher than it might have been otherwise.18 A longer delay in emissions reductions will 
result in a commensurately higher peak warming. 
¶9  Delays in emissions reductions will also render certain peak-warming targets 
unattainable. Assuming that society eventually achieves a zero-emissions rate (neither a 
net increase in carbon emissions nor a net extraction of atmospheric carbon), the total 
amount of emitted carbon determines the lowest peak warming.19 As a result, by 2012, 
the 1.5°C peak-warming target became unachievable. The 2°C peak-warming target will 
become similarly unachievable by 2027.20  
¶10  We can also anticipate that by the time we commit to reducing carbon emissions, 
our ability to do so will be limited. Historically, society has required fifty to sixty years to 
switch to a new energy source for half of global energy needs.21 This delay results from 
the level of investment and infrastructural change that a transition to a new energy source 
requires.22 Unfortunately, postponing this shift to renewables results in “carbon lock-
in”—referring to the continued construction of fossil-fuel infrastructure. As society 
invests more in carbon infrastructure, fewer options to reduce emissions remain and the 
commitment to fossil fuels becomes more expensive to abandon.23  
 
16 WORLD BANK, supra note 6, at 1. 
17 Myles R. Allen & Thomas F. Stocker, Impact of Delay in Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 4 
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24 (2014). Allen and Stocker use an increase of 2% in their calculation. 
However, the mean annual increase of atmospheric carbon has averaged 0.57% since 2005. See Annual 
Data: Atmospheric CO2, CO2NOW.ORG, http://co2now.org/current-co2/co2-now/annual-co2.html (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2014). Accordingly, this Article uses 0.50% to better approximate the actual increase of 
atmospheric carbon. 
18 Allen & Stocker, supra note 17, at 24.  
19 Thomas F. Stockey, The Closing Door of Climate Targets, SCIENCE, Jan. 18, 2013, at 280, 281. 
20 Id. 
21 Vaclav Smil, The Long Slow Rise of Solar and Wind, SCI. AM., Jan. 2014, at 52, 54. For instance, the 
transition from wood to coal as the primary energy source took sixty years. Id. at 55. Subsequent 
transitions, however, have taken longer. Oil, after nearly ninety years of use, provides only 40% of world 
energy. Similarly, the transition from oil to natural gas is occurring at an even slower rate. Id. Indeed, 
natural gas has required fifty-five years to supply 25% of the world energy market. By comparison, oil 
required only forty years and coal required only thirty-five years. Id. at 56. The transition to renewable 
energy is proceeding even more slowly. After twenty years of subsidized development, “new” renewables 
(wind, solar, modern biofuels) provide less than 5% of global energy. Id. at 54–55.  
22 Id. at 56. Globally, the investment in energy infrastructure—including coal mines, oil wells, gas 
pipelines, refineries, and filling stations—is worth at least $20 trillion. Id. at 57. Furthermore, power plants 
have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, and some have operational lives of up to 100 years. 
Consequently, only 2%–4% of existing sources require replacement in a given year. Gert Jan Kramer & 
Martin Haigh, No Quick Switch to Low-Carbon Energy, 462 NATURE 568, 568 (2009). 
23 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 21 (2013). 
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¶11  Finally, delays in emissions cuts necessitate much larger reductions in future 
emissions.24 Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, which requires 
much sharper cuts to attain a particular level.25 Unfortunately, economic models indicate 
that our ability to reduce emissions may not surpass 5% per year.26 We can thus foresee 
that regardless of our future commitment to cut emissions, several structural barriers will 
limit the rate at which this reduction can occur. 
¶12  Besides these structural barriers to reducing carbon emissions, scientists calculate 
that once we eliminate carbon emissions, planetary warming will continue for decades, 
with eventual global temperatures remaining at these new levels for centuries. Even with 
rapid mitigation of carbon emissions, radiative forcing will continue to increase for 
nearly ten years,27 while the thermal inertia of the ocean will delay the full magnitude of 
warming. Initially, the ocean absorbs heat, but then it radiates this heat for hundreds of 
years.28 Thus, taking into account these different factors, even after carbon emissions 
cease, the global temperature will continue to increase significantly,29 and will then 
remain at its new level for what many believe to be at least 1,000 years.30 In sum, merely 
cutting emissions will not suffice—a true solution requires reducing atmospheric 
carbon.31  
C. Climate Engineering: What It Is and How It Can Help  
¶13  The science underlying climate change demonstrates two key considerations. First, 
significant climate disruption is inevitable, regardless of future emission levels. Second, 
mitigation alone cannot return the planet to its preindustrial state. To avoid severe climate 
disruption, we will need to explore a broad range of options. One of these options is 
climate engineering. 
¶14  Climate engineering32 identifies a broad range of methods and technologies 
intended to alter the earth’s climate system, counteracting climate change and the effects 
 
24 Bryan K. Mignone et al., Atmospheric Stabilization and the Timing of Carbon Mitigation, 88 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 251, 253 (2008).  
25 Id. at 255.  
26 See Stockey, supra note 19, at 281. 
27 See Detlef P. van Vuuren & Elke Stehfest, If Climate Action Becomes Urgent: The Importance of 
Response Times for Various Climate Strategies, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 473, 480 (2013). 
28 See JEFF GOODELL, HOW TO COOL THE PLANET 10 (2010). 
29 H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions, 35 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2008). The IPCC estimates that if the composition of the atmosphere 
were to be held constant, the global temperature would still rise by up to 0.9°C by the end of the 21st 
Century. IPCC, supra note 2, at 822.  
30 See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1704, 1704 (2009).  
31 As one of the authors of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report describes the situation, “A large fraction 
of climate change is thus irreversible on a human timescale, except if net anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
were strongly negative over a sustained period.” Fred Pearce, World Won’t Cool Without Geoengineering, 
Warns Report, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 25, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24261-
world-wont-cool-without-geoengineering-warns-report.html#.U11Md1cvBfS. 
32 Numerous terms besides “climate engineering” have been used to refer to these efforts, including 
“geoengineering,” which appears most frequently. Although “climate engineering” may more accurately 
describe the processes, here it will be used interchangeably with “geoengineering.” BART GORDON, H.R. 
COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 111TH CONG., ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: RESEARCH NEEDS AND STRATEGIES 
FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 39 (2010). 
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thereof.33 Geoengineering is set apart from other acts that alter planetary systems in two 
ways: it involves deliberate efforts and requires global cooperation.34  
¶15  Climate engineering techniques fall into two broad categories.35 The first, solar 
radiation management (SRM), would increase the reflection of sunlight to cool the 
planet.36 The second, carbon dioxide removal (CDR), would remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere.  
¶16  SRM techniques reflect a small percentage of inbound light and heat from the sun 
back into space.37 They cover a range of methods and costs; some are simplistic while 
others are technologically complex and potentially prohibitively expensive.38 These 
techniques also vary as to the part of the environment they affect, such as the earth’s 
surface, its atmosphere, or outer space. Surface-based techniques include painting roofs 
white, planting more reflective crops, and covering desert or ocean surfaces with 
reflective materials.39 Atmospheric methods would increase the reflectivity of clouds (by 
adding sea salt or other materials to whiten clouds) or inject aerosol particles into the 
atmosphere. The latter would mimic the temporary global cooling following the ejection 
of sulfur particles from volcanoes.40 A major advantage of some SRM techniques is that 
they may be the only means to reduce the global temperature almost immediately, should 
that become necessary to avert a climate emergency or to buy time to more fully 
implement mitigation procedures.41 
¶17  In contrast to SRM, CDR removes CO2 directly from the atmosphere. CDR 
techniques involve methods that store CO2 in the ocean or ground. Ocean-based methods 
include ocean fertilization, which promotes the growth of carbon-consuming 
phytoplankton, and enhanced upwelling/downwelling, which alters ocean circulation to 
increase the availability of nutrients to enhance phytoplankton growth (upwelling) while 
accelerating the return of CO2-concentrated surface water to the deep sea 
(downwelling).42 Land-based techniques include direct air capture and sequestration, the 
use of biomass and sequestration, and afforestation.43   
 
33 IPCC, supra note 2, at 23, Annex I. 
34 See ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY ix 
(2009). 
35 The Royal Society, the United Kingdom’s national academy of sciences, produced a seminal analysis 
of geoengineering that utilized this distinction. Id. at 1. Subsequent reports, including those prepared by a 
House subcommittee, the National Regulatory Commission, the Government Accountability Office, and 
the IPCC, have followed this dichotomy. See supra notes 2, 8, 32, and infra note 40. 
36 IPCC, supra note 2, at 91. 
37 ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 34, at 23.  
38 Space-based reflective mirrors, for instance, could require several decades and trillions of dollars to 
put into place. Roger Angel, Feasibility of Cooling the Earth with a Cloud of Small Spacecraft near the 
Inner Lagrange Point (L1), 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17184, 17189 (2006).  
39 Peter J. Irvine, Andy Ridgwell, & Daniel J. Lunt, Climatic Effects of Surface Albedo Geoengineering, 
116 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2 (2011). 
40 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY 
COULD FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 10 (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT]. Aerosol methods are modeled after the global cooling effect 
produced when volcanoes emit sulfur into the atmosphere. For instance, when Mount Pinatubo erupted in 
1991, it cooled the globe by approximately 0.5°C in less than one year. David W. Keith, Edward Parson & 
M. Granger Morgan, Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now, 463 NATURE 426, 426 (2010).  
41 IPCC, supra note 2, at 91, 96. 
42 GAO CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 40, at 7.  
43 Id. at 8. “Afforestation” refers to the establishment of trees on non-treed land. INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
Vol. 13:1] Anthony E. Chavez 
 7 
¶18  CDR removes CO2 directly from the atmosphere by either increasing natural-
carbon sinks or using chemical engineering to remove CO2.44 CDR can thus reverse 
planetary warming by reducing the atmosphere’s CO2 content. However, it requires the 
reduction of a significant fraction of CO2 before it can alter the atmospheric balance. 
CDR may therefore require several decades to have a discernible effect on the 
environment. On the other hand, its ability to lower the CO2 content of the atmosphere 
may become critical if significant mitigation efforts come too late to prevent CO2 from 
reaching levels causing dangerous warming.45 And in contrast to SRM methods, CDR 
involves fewer environmental risks. By removing CO2 from the atmosphere, CDR simply 
returns the atmosphere to its preindustrial state. This differs from SRM, which, 
notwithstanding several possible adverse consequences, would only create an artificial 
and approximate balance between increased atmospheric-gas concentrations and sunlight 
levels.46  
III. THE INFANCY OF CLIMATE-ENGINEERING RESEARCH AND THE IMPACT OF PATENTS 
ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
¶19  Concerted geoengineering research remains in its infancy. Nevertheless, the 
patenting of related inventions has grown substantially over the past five years. A number 
of these patents’ characteristics, however, suggest that they might deter access to this 
technology, potentially stymieing future climate-engineering innovation. 
A. Patent Law Basics  
¶20  The power to award patents derives from the Constitution. Article I provides that, 
“Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”47 Through the Patent Act of 1790, Congress 
established the first patent system for the United States.48 Congress passed five 
subsequent Patent Acts.49 The 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) was the first major 
 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (2000), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/land_use/index.php?idp=47. 
44 IPCC, supra note 2, at 9. 
45 For instance, in its emissions report, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) calculates 
that scenarios with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target have net negative total greenhouse 
emissions. To achieve this result, these scenarios assume utilization of carbon capture and storage, a CDR 
technology. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 3 (2012). 
46 GAO CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 40, at 4. 
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
48 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May 
Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 385 
(2008). Under the Patent Act, a board consisting of the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney 
General would consider all patent applications. Id. 
49 Jesse S. Chui, To What Extent Can Congress Change the Patent Right Without Effecting a Taking?, 
34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 448 (2007). 
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reform in patent law since 1952.50 As discussed later, the AIA provides a process for 
prioritized examination of patent applications.51 
¶21  An inventor commences the patent process by submitting an application to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).52 The USPTO assigns the 
application to an examiner who specializes in that field.53 The examiner then searches 
previous patents and patent applications, referred to as “prior art,” to determine if the new 
application involves a novel, useful, and nonobvious invention.54 The application may 
proceed through several rounds of internal evaluation, interviews of the applicant, and 
possibly even appeals before the agency grants the patent.55  
¶22  The patent application process can be both long and expensive. Processing an 
application often requires multiple years,56 with an average pendency of 29.8 months.57 
Applicants typically spend tens of thousands of dollars on, among other things, attorneys’ 
fees, pre-filing searches, drawing fees, and filing fees before receiving their patents.58 
Patents involving environment-oriented inventions tend to be more complicated, and 
consequently, usually require longer processing times and higher costs.59 
¶23  The grant of a patent provides one primary benefit: the patent owner may exclude 
others from using the invention. Specifically, the patentee can exclude another from 
making, using, or selling any patented invention,60 retaining this right for twenty years.61 
In exchange for this right, the patentee discloses her invention to the public in the manner 
required by statute.62 The patentee may receive royalties by licensing the invention 
during the period of the patent.63 
¶24  The patent system provides several other benefits. The exclusivity provided by 
patents grants monopoly powers, which foster innovation by enabling inventors to profit 
from their work.64 For twenty years, inventors can choose to use their inventions, license 
them to others, or keep them off the market. This enables inventors to recover research 
 
50 Caitlin E. Lanning, Mapping Our Future: The Impact of Gene Patents on Scientific Research and 
Health Care in the United States, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 375, 397 (2013). 
51 Id. at 401. 
52 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012). 
53 Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents 
Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 106 (2011). 
54 Id. 
55 Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property Innovation: A 
New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 51, 61 (2005). 
56 Patent Time Frame: How Long Does It Take to Get a Patent?, UNIV. CAL. SANTA BARBARA OFFICE 
OF TECH. & INDUS. ALLIANCES, http://tia.ucsb.edu/faculty/information-resources/patent-basics/ (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2014).  
57 Data Visualization Center, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last 
visited July 28, 2013). 
58 See Emilie Winckel, Hardly a Black-and-White Matter: Analyzing the Validity and Protection of 
Single-Color Trademarks Within the Fashion Industry, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1018 n.13 (2013).  
59 Mandel, supra note 55, at 61. 
60 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  
61 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating that the term of the patent lasts from the date on which the 
patent issues to twenty years after the date on which the inventor filed the application). 
62 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
63 See Nicholas G. Smith, Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 503, 516 (2011). 
64 Scott Taylor, Where Are the Green Machines?: Using the Patent System to Encourage Green 
Invention and Technology Transfer, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 577, 583 (2011). 
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and development costs and prevents free riding.65 It also provides inventors with several 
competitive advantages, especially the ability to attract venture capital and the 
opportunity to develop related products.66 And importantly, this system promotes full 
disclosure of inventions. Early disclosure avoids the wasting of resources in unnecessary 
experimentation67 and facilitates the development of successive inventions, thereby 
fostering technological advancement.68 
¶25  Despite these benefits, the patent system imposes various costs. For instance, the 
effective monopoly power provided to inventors raises the invention’s price, thus 
decreasing its overall availability to society during the patent period.69 In addition, 
multiple inventors may waste resources by duplicating inventions that have limited 
availability.70 Among others, these costs must be weighed against the likely benefits of 
any potential modification of the patent system. 
B. Dramatic Increase in Climate-Engineering Patents and Recent Issues 
¶26  Despite the relative infancy of climate-engineering technologies, various entities 
are currently confronting issues that will drastically influence their development. The 
USPTO has already received hundreds of applications for patents on these technologies. 
Furthermore, the number of geoengineering patents granted by the agency has risen 
dramatically. But a review of these patents illustrates several disturbing trends— 
specifically, how the breadth of some of these patents could block future developments. 
Moreover, original inventors are reassigning these patents at an alarming pace, 
concentrating these patents in the hands of a limited number of patent holders.  
¶27  This author directed a review of USPTO records to determine trends in applications 
for and granting of patents involving climate-engineering technologies. The review 
searched the USPTO database using words describing the most common SRM and CDR 
methods.71 The review included only patents related to one of these two categories, 
excluding patents pertaining to short-term weather modification. As described below, this 
review focused on both patent applications72 and patents awarded.  
 
65 Niels J. Melius, Trolling for Standards: How Courts and the Administrative State Can Help Deter 
Patent Holdup and Promote Innovation, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 161, 169 (2012). 
66 Sarah Tran, Prioritizing Innovation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 499, 520 (2012). 
67 Cf. Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the 
Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 153 (2004). 
68 See Taylor, supra note 64, at 583. Commentators recognize an additional benefit known as the 
“prospect theory.” This refers to the notion that the patent holder can encourage successive inventors to 
share information and avoid duplicative research. Mireles, supra note 67, at 155. 
69 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, THE CASE AGAINST PATENTS 5–6 (2012). 
70 See Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1292 (2001). 
71 Search results on file with author [hereinafter Geoengineering Patent Search]. The search used a 
number of terms associated with climate engineering, including “aerosols,” “albedo,” “biochar,” “carbon,” 
“capture,” “climate,” “cloud,” “geoengineering,” “global warming,” “inject,” “phytoplankton,” “pyrolysis,” 
“radiation,” “sequestration,” “solar,” “storage,” and “stratospheric.” Then, the search results were reviewed 
for relevance. 
72 In this discussion, “applications” refers to applications submitted to the USPTO but not yet granted. 
The USPTO, however, does not report information regarding patent applications received before 2001. See 
Finding Pre-2001 Applied Not Granted Applications, STACKEXCHANGE, http://patents.stackexchange.com/ 
questions/3368/finding-pre-2001-applied-not-granted-applications (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
Accordingly, this discussion does not incorporate application data from before that year. 
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¶28  The number of climate-engineering patent applications and patents granted has 
risen dramatically over the past five years. The following chart reflects the number of 




¶29  As the chart demonstrates, before 2008, the combined number of patent 
applications and patents granted for geoengineering technologies did not exceed twenty 
in a single year. However, the total exceeded forty in 2009, and eventually increased to 
more than one hundred in 2013. Moreover, the rate at which the USPTO has granted 
these patents has similarly increased. For instance, the USPTO never granted more than 
ten such patents annually before 2010. Four years later, the annual number of 
geoengineering patents granted increased nearly tenfold. In sum, both the number of 
patents granted and applications filed illustrate startling growth over the past four years.73  
¶30  CDR methods have dominated this recent growth, constituting more than 90% of 
the geoengineering patents approved by the USPTO. Specifically, of the patents granted, 
more than half (54%) concern carbon capture, and more than one-third (37%) involve 
carbon sequestration.74 Particle-dispersion (4%) and solar-ray-reflection (2%) patents 
 
73 A recently published review of climate-engineering patents found both similar and inconsistent results 
to those found in our Geoengineering Patent Search. See Oldham et al., Mapping the Landscape of Climate 
Engineering, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Nov. 17, 2014, at 1–20, available at 
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/372/2031/20140065. They used fewer search terms, but they 
performed their search over more databases (those of the USPTO, the European Patent Office, and the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty). Id. at 3–4. They found that geoengineering patents peaked in 2007, but they 
acknowledge that this may reflect a lack of data availability in some databases for recent years. Id. at 11. 
These results conflict with their own findings regarding publications concerning geoengineering, which 
they found “accelerated” after the publication of a seminal article by Paul Crutzen in 2006. Id. at 5 (citing 
Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a 
Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 211–12 (2006)); see infra note 89 (discussing the impact of 
the Crutzen article). 
74 Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71. Some patents, which this author categorized as carbon 
sequestration, clearly identified inventions that involved burial, application, or use of captured carbon. 
Other patents identified inventions that both captured carbon from a source and then provided for its 
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commonly recur, with patents involving other various methods making up the difference 
(3%).75 
¶31  A review of these patents further reveals that many of these inventions are assigned 
to only a few patent holders. Consequently, the future development of these technologies 
is concentrated in the hands of a few.76 Only three inventors (or groups of inventors) are 
credited with inventing five or more climate-engineering patents.77 Combined, these 
parties have invented twenty-five (10%) of the patented technologies. However, many 
geoengineering patents have been assigned to other parties, with 200 original patent 
holders transferring ownership to 122 assignees.78 Eight of these assignees received five 
or more patents. In total, these eight large patent holders were assigned fifty-six (23%) 
recent geoengineering patents.79 And of these fifty-six assignments, only eight were 
transferred to a non-corporate entity—the U.S. Department of Energy.  
¶32  Although these assignments have resulted in concentrated ownership, they remain 
spread across a number of different industries. A review of some of the largest patent 
holders and the industries in which they operate shows the following industry distribution 
for holders of 110 of these patents: 
 




Oil  12 
Chemical 8 
 
¶33  Additionally, a characteristic that typifies many of these patents is the breadth of 
their terms. For example, Patent 6,056,919 states: 
 A method of sequestering carbon dioxide in a deep open ocean 
comprising the following steps: 
(1) testing an area of the surface of a deep open ocean, in order to 
confirm that at least a first nutrient is missing to a significant extent 
from said area, and to identify said first missing nutrient, and 
 
75 Id. The findings of the Oldham et al. search corroborated these general patterns. In their search, they 
found that approximately 80% of geoengineering patents involved CDR. Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 
11.  
76 Common ownership of patents provides a useful indication of patent concentration, but more 
meaningful approaches may be available. Daniel R. Cahoy notes that just counting patents fails to account 
for the importance of foundational patents or integrated patent portfolios. No standard methodology exists, 
however, for such analysis. Daniel R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology 
Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 805, 846–47 (2012). 
77 Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71; see Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 14 (finding 
geoengineering patents to be held by small networks of inventors associated with particular companies and 
also by a number of individuals). 
78 Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71. 
79 Another eight patents were assigned equally between Schlumburger Technology Corporation’s 
Massachusetts and Texas affiliates. If they are treated as one entity, then nine parties control sixty-four 
(26%) of the patents. Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71. 
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(2) applying to said area a first fertilizer which comprises said first 
missing nutrient, to fertilize said area with an appropriate amount of 
said first missing nutrient whereby carbon dioxide is sequestered, 
(3) limiting zooplankton and fish growth in said area by applying 
said first fertilizer in pulses; and 
(4) measuring the amount of sequestered carbon dioxide that results 
from said fertilization of said area.80 
Conceivably, the terms of this patent are broad enough to cover numerous processes.81 
For instance, the patent claim does not identify the applicable testing procedures, the 
extent of the area to be tested, the sought-after nutrients, the type of “fertilizer” used, or 
the “pulses” that the procedure contemplates for applying the “fertilizer.” In fact, such a 
broadly stated patent encompasses most ocean-fertilization methods while excluding few. 
Similarly, granted in 2013, Patent 8,603,424 states in part: 
Before the invention is described in greater detail, it is to be understood 
that the invention is not limited to particular embodiments described 
herein as such embodiments may vary. It is also to be understood that the 
terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular 
embodiments only, and is not intended to be limiting, since the scope of 
the invention will be limited only by the appended claims.82 
Thus, the USPTO granted a patent which by its own language specifically rejects any 
limitations upon its terms. Discussed infra, overly broad patents create myriad issues.  
¶34  A review of these patents also highlights the delay inherent to the application 
process. On average, the USPTO has required nearly thirty-two months to approve a 
climate-engineering patent.83 However, this average masks a wide range in processing 
time. On the short end, the USPTO has awarded a patent within six months of the 
application’s receipt.84 At the other extreme, the USPTO has required more than eighty 
months on two separate occasions.85  
 
80 U.S. Patent No. 6,056,919 (filed May 4, 1999). 
81 See Shobita Parthasarathy et al., A Public Good? Geoengineering and Intellectual Property 5 (Sci. 
Tech. & Pub. Policy Program, Working Paper No. 10-1, 2010), available at http://www.umt.edu/ethics/ 
ethicsgeoengineering/Workshop/articles1/Chris%20Avery.pdf. 
82 U.S. Patent No. 8,603,424 (filed Oct. 11, 2012); see also Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 10 (noting 
that geoengineering-patent claims “are often deliberately constructed in a broad way . . . to capture the 
maximum range of possible uses of a claimed invention”).  
83 Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71. 
84 The inventor submitted his application (for using satellites to reflect solar energy to modify the earth’s 
atmosphere) on October 8, 1999, and the USPTO granted it as Patent 6,045,089 on April 4, 2000. U.S. 
Patent No. 6,045,089 (filed Oct. 8, 1999). 
85 In the first instance, the inventors submitted their application (for a lime-based sorbent to capture 
CO2) on November 14, 2003, and the USPTO granted it as Patent 7,879,139 on February 1, 2011. U.S. 
Patent No. 7,879,139 (filed Nov. 14, 2003). In the second case, the inventor submitted his application (for a 
process for removing CO2 from gaseous streams) on March 4, 2004, and the USPTO granted it as Patent 
7,901,487 on March 8, 2011. U.S. Patent No. 7,901,487 (filed Mar. 4, 2004). 
Vol. 13:1] Anthony E. Chavez 
 13 
C. The Current Patent System Exacerbates Geoengineering-Patent Issues 
¶35  As the number of climate-engineering patents has accelerated, the risk that they 
will impede access and future innovation has similarly increased. The granting of a large 
number of broad, fundamental patents can create substantial barriers to subsequent 
innovators.  
¶36  While the number of patent applications and granted patents has increased 
significantly in recent years,86 the corresponding rate of increase for geoengineering 
patents has risen even more drastically. Indeed, climate engineering appears to be 
undergoing a “patent land-grab.” This occurs when a lack of clarity in future technologies 
encourages speculators to seek patents in developing fields, which in turn causes actual 
inventors to file patent applications to avoid a competitive disadvantage.87 Coupled with 
the increasing number of patent applications for related technologies, the lack of 
geoengineering research makes the climate-engineering environment ripe for 
opportunistic exploitation. Indeed, geoengineering is one of the few new fields (along 
with nanotechnology) in nearly a century to experience substantial patenting at the 
outset.88  
¶37  In light of the early stage of climate-engineering research, this patent land-grab is 
particularly pernicious. First, knowledge about geoengineering is in its infancy. Scientists 
have contemplated climate engineering as a response to climate change for less than one 
decade.89 Unsurprisingly, significant research into these methods has yet to commence.90 
Second, and in part because of the novelty inherent to this technology, a number of 
climate-engineering patents are poorly defined or overly broad.91 Consequently, holders 
of some of these early geoengineering patents may control broad swaths of these 
methods. This is normally a cause for concern because of the immense control patent 
holders have over future inventions.92 Here, this disparity is especially troublesome 
 
86 U.S. Patent Statistics Summary Table, Calendar Years 1963 to 2012, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified July 24, 2014, 6:22 PM). 
87 Brian H. Lawrence, Clarifying Patent Law’s Role in Financial Service: Time to Settle the “Bill”ski?, 
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 319, 341 n.180 (2012). 
88 Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606 (2005). Professor Lemley 
notes that the building blocks of several recent industries, such as computer hardware, software, the 
Internet, and biotechnology, were “either unpatented, through mistake or because they were created by 
government or university scientists with no interest in patents, or the patents presented no obstacle because 
the government compelled licensing of the patents, or they were ultimately invalidated.” Id. In other fields, 
including lasers, semiconductors, and polymer chemistry, “basic building-block patents did issue, but they 
were delayed so long in interference proceedings that the industry developed in the absence of enforceable 
patents.” Id. at 606–07. 
89 See Wylie A. Carr et al., Public Engagement on Solar Radiation Management and Why It Needs to 
Happen Now, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 567, 568 (2013). Although the concept of intentionally altering the 
climate had been discussed previously, a 2006 article by Paul J. Crutzen, a Nobel Laureate, is credited with 
triggering serious consideration of climate engineering as a response to climate change. Id.; see Crutzen, 
supra note 73, at 211–12. 
90 See Anthony E. Chavez, A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The Geoengineering Branch, 5 
WASH. & LEE J. CLIMATE & ENV’T 93, 123 (2014). 
91 Parthasarathy et al., supra note 81, at 5.  
92 See Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket: A Proposed Patent Pooling Solution to the 
Nanotechnology “Building Block” Patent Thicket Problem, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 555, 561–62 (2012). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 5  
 
 14 
because it both deters future innovation and bestows control over technology with 
potentially immeasurable societal value to only a few.93 
¶38  The timing of patent land-grabs also creates unique problems. By their nature, land 
grabs occur early in the development of a field. Because of this, applications often seek 
building-block patents, which cover fundamental products and processes. Building-block 
patents are therefore distinct “from incremental improvement patents, which have a much 
narrower claim scope.”94  
¶39  Awarding building-block patents, especially early in an industry’s development, 
can frustrate the field’s growth. Patents for building-block technologies do not always 
possess any marketable value of their own, but the inventions they cover can be crucial to 
downstream development. Thus, patenting these inventions can slow industry 
innovation.95 Moreover, overly broad patents exacerbate this problem. Broad patents 
commonly arise at the confluence of several circumstances: a field is novel, standardized 
terminology has not developed, patent examiners lack experience with and expertise in 
the new technology, and applicants seek “to capture the largest possible grant of IP 
protection with the claims of a single patent, leading applicants to draft claims that reach 
too far.”96 As discussed previously, geoengineering patents share most of these 
characteristics. 
¶40  Making these adverse effects worse, the patent review process is inherently biased, 
favoring approval of broad, building-block patents. When applications in new industries 
are involved, an examiner may not be able to find an embodiment of the claimed 
invention in prior art. In such circumstances, USPTO policy requires that the claim be 
allowed, even if stated broadly.97 This is the case even where the examiner believes, but 
cannot establish, that the claim exceeds the area actually explored.98 
¶41  Broad initial patents can lock up technologies or retard development in a number of 
ways.99 Overly broad patents prevent potential subsequent inventors from developing 
new inventions derived from the original patent.100 Furthermore, they allow patent 
holders to deny licenses, charge exorbitant royalties, or engage in delaying tactics, most 
notably litigation.101 A related issue surfaces when patents are so broad that they overlap. 
This widespread distribution of broad, overlapping patents causes various problems, such 
as those stemming from “patent thickets” or “anticommons.”102 
 
93 See Cressey, supra note 3. 
94 John C. Miller & Drew L. Harris, The Carbon Nanotube Patent Landscape, 3 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. 
& BUS. 427, 435 (2006). 
95 See Stiles, supra note 92, at 561–62. 
96 Id. at 563. 
97 See Amit Makker, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Commercialization, 84 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2011). 
98 Id. 
99 See Lemley, supra note 88, at 618–19. 
100 See Samuel Reger, It’s Not So Obvious: How the Manifestly Evident Standard Affects Litigation 
Costs by Reducing the Need for Claim Construction, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 729, 732 (2014). 
101 See Nikola L. Datzov, The Machine-or-Transformation Patentability Test: The Reinvention of 
Innovation, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 292 (2010) (explaining that innovators may avoid the market 
because of fears of litigation). 
102 Lemley, supra note 88, at 620. 
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¶42  A patent thicket arises when patent rights extend more broadly than the actual 
products claimed in a given field.103 A “dense web of overlapping intellectual property 
rights” develops,104 and the resulting thicket “choke[s] out an industry.”105 A 
geoengineering patent thicket may be especially dense because geoengineering end-
products likely incorporate components from many different patentable inventions. For 
instance, an aerosol method might involve patents for the specific method (e.g., balloons, 
hoses, etc.), the materials,106 the aerosol injector, and other aspects. Thus, each facet may 
require different inventions patented by different inventors, further complicating the 
thicket.107  
¶43  A patent thicket can impede invention in a number of ways. Specifically, it usually 
requires an inventor to incur additional costs to avoid infringement. While all hopeful 
inventors must research whether their inventions infringe upon existing patents, and if so, 
negotiate licenses108—the attendant costs of this process drastically increase when 
numerous overlapping patents are involved.109 In this context, patents impede rather than 
promote innovation.110  
¶44  A related problem is that of a patent anticommons. The “tragedy of the 
anticommons” is the mirror image of its better-known cousin.111 The problem of a 
commons arises when too few exclusionary property rights result in exhaustion of a 
resource.112 In the alternative, an anticommons occurs when too many persons have been 
awarded exclusionary rights, causing a resource not to be fully utilized.113 Thus, the 
anticommons involves “fragmented property rights, the aggregation of which is necessary 
to make effective use of the property.”114 But the rights are not just fragmented; they are 
 
103 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1614 (2003). 
104 Dana Beldiman, Patent Choke Points in the Influenza-Related Medicines Industry: Can Patent Pools 
Provide Balanced Access?, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 31, 46 (2012) (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
105 Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1627. 
106 Although the material commonly mentioned is sulfur, scientists are exploring alternative materials, 
such as titanium dioxide, which has high reflectivity, well-researched safety, and significant availability. 
Peter Davidson, Chris Burgoyne, Hugh Hunt & Matt Causier, Lifting Options for Stratospheric Aerosol 
Geoengineering: Advantages of Tethered Balloon Systems, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 
4263, 4266 (2012). 
107 Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1628 (discussing patent thickets and the semiconductor industry). 
Burk and Lemley and others point to semiconductors as an example of an end-product consisting of 
different components covered by overlapping patents. They also involve cumulative technologies. For 
semiconductors, cross licensing avoids patent interference. By contrast, in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries, cross licensing primarily enables the exchange of technologies. DAVID J. TEECE, ESSAYS IN 
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT AND POLICY: SELECTED PAPERS OF DAVID J. TEECE 206 (2003). 
108 Makker, supra note 97, at 1175. 
109 See Stiles, supra note 92, at 559 (noting that overlapping building-block patents have deterred many 
prospective inventors from proceeding with innovation plans). 
110 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1629. 
111 D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 
1190 (2013). 
112 See Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 365, 382–83 (2007). 
113 Id. at 382; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698. 
114 Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1611. 
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dispersed among multiple owners. “Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into 
usable private property is often brutal and slow.”115 
¶45  Because of the diffusion of these rights, downstream inventors need to incur greater 
costs to acquire licenses. These costs will include higher search fees, and more time and 
money spent negotiating license fees.116 Furthermore, because innovators typically 
cannot know in advance which rights will become necessary to produce their inventions, 
they often must acquire more licenses than they actually need.117 Such expenses 
essentially serve as a tax on further innovation.118 Consequently, in contrast to a 
commons problem, the anticommons results in the underutilization of the property.119 
Specifically, innovators are unable or unwilling (because of costs) to assemble the 
assorted inventions to produce an innovative product. 
¶46  Thickets and anticommons are similar yet distinct. Thickets involve horizontally 
overlapping patents.120 Anticommons arise either horizontally with “different companies 
hold[ing] rights at the same level of distribution,” or vertically with the final product 
combining upstream and downstream components.121 Unlike a thicket, which results from 
the distribution of broad patent rights, an anticommons requires the aggregation of a 
multiplicity of patents controlled by numerous owners.122 Both, however, derive from the 
excessive granting of patent rights. Moreover, an industry can suffer from both problems 
concurrently.123  
¶47  One last issue foretells problems for geoengineering innovation: delays in 
processing patent applications. Timing, both at the beginning and end of the patent 
system, can impair the development of geoengineering inventions. Delays in processing 
patent applications slow the rate of innovation.124 On average, patent applications require 
more than two years to process, extending up to six years in many instances.125 The 
USPTO has required an even longer period to grant geoengineering patents.126 Since the 
twenty-year exclusion period usually commences upon the filing of the patent 
 
115 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 698. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff in a patent enforcement action must establish that monetary damages would not be 
adequate to compensate for its injury before receiving the relief of a permanent injunction. 547 U.S. 388, 
391–92 (2006). Nevertheless, decisions of the Federal Circuit may limit the ability of this decision to 
prevent patent holdups. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 30 (2009) (noting that a Federal Circuit decision allowing patentees to obtain up to fifty-
times actual damages may effectively serve as an injunction).  
116 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 700.  
117 See First, supra note 112, at 382. 
118 Id. This assumes that these negotiations proceed relatively smoothly. In some instances, patent 
owners refuse to license their inventions, id., or become holdouts, agreeing to license only if they receive 
excessive licenses. Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1611. 
119 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 124 (2000). 
120 Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1614. 
121 Id. at 1612–13. 
122 See id. at 1613. 
123 See Beldiman, supra note 104, at 47 (noting the presence of both thickets and anticommons in the 
influenza-related medicines market). 
124 “Patent backlogs hinder the deployment of innovation and have clear adverse effects on the global 
economy.” USPTO and UKIPO Announce Action Plan to Reduce Global Patent Backlogs, USPTO (Mar. 
10, 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_09.jsp. 
125 See Patent Time Frame: How Long Does It Take to Get a Patent?, supra note 56. 
126 See Winckel, supra note 58, at 1018 n.13. 
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application, a processing delay reduces both the value of the patent to the inventor and 
the availability of the invention to innovators.127 
¶48  At the back end, the twenty-year exclusion period also impedes the development of 
climate-engineering inventions. Climate-engineering systems remain in their infancy, 
with scientists having conducted only limited research on these methods.128 
Consequently, most methods will likely require a decade or more of computer analysis 
and field-testing before they are ready for implementation.129 Limiting access to 
geoengineering technologies only further delays the development of the underlying 
methodologies.130 
IV. SEVERAL APPROACHES MIGHT HELP REDUCE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE 
PATENTING OF GEOENGINEERING INVENTIONS 
¶49  Despite the various issues arising from the patenting of climate-engineering 
inventions, several possible solutions—or combinations of solutions—can help minimize 
these concerns. This section reviews and analyzes prior approaches and considers their 
appropriateness for climate-engineering patents. Before exploring these strategies, 
however, this section identifies some aspects of geoengineering that policymakers must 
consider when modifying the patent system to address these inventions. 
A. Several Considerations Apply Uniquely to Geoengineering Patents 
¶50  While geoengineering patents are new, many of the aforementioned issues are 
anything but. Previous problems inspire solutions that are useful here, but no single 
approach provides a perfect or complete answer. Thus, to best place these approaches in 
their appropriate context, proper analysis must begin with the considerations that apply 
uniquely to climate-engineering patents.  
¶51  First, time is essential. With the planet’s climate approaching a tipping point,131 and 
the vast amount of time required to develop and implement geoengineering methods,132 
one could argue that humankind is already out of time. Certainly, any further delay will 
make research, development, and implementation even more urgent. 
¶52  Second, the eventual end-user is likely to be a governmental body, such as the U.S. 
government or a similar multinational entity.133 This has several implications for the 
 
127 See Tran, supra note 66, at 520. 
128 ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 34, at 52.  
129 See Timothy A. Fox & Lee Chapman, Review: Engineering Geo-Engineering, 18 METEOROLOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS 1, 6 (2011).  
130 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 338 (2011) 
(noting that patent protection may delay climate-change-related discoveries and their development). 
131 Based upon the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, a tipping point may be only twenty-five years 
away. Barboza, supra note 8. Holding global warming to an increase of less than 2°C, on the other hand, 
may soon be impossible within half of that time. Stockey, supra note 19, at 281. 
132 See Fox & Chapman, supra note 129, at 6.  
133 Because of the global consequences of implementing geoengineering, we can anticipate that 
international agreements will eventually govern its implementation, if not also its testing. KELSI BRACMORT 
& RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 29 (2013). 
Moreover, such agreements are likely to impose moratoriums on implementation absent international 
consent. For instance, the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have already imposed such a 
moratorium. Chavez, supra note 90, at 146–47. Thus, because of these considerations, the “consumer” of 
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patent system. For instance, if necessary, the U.S. government will be more likely to use 
whatever means required to break any patent logjams, which it has done previously, most 
notably during World War I.134 Active governmental involvement is foreseeable if patent 
holders unreasonably withhold access to essential patents. Additionally, with a 
government as the primary consumer, regular market forces will exercise less force.  
¶53  In sum, geoengineering is in its infancy. Most of these methods are still at the 
conceptual or research stages,135 and few field-tests have been proposed.136 The 
development of new methods, the involvement of new players, and the invention of new 
devices are likely to cause drastic change in the geoengineering field. Accordingly, 
flexibility will be an important component of any application review process. 
B. The USPTO Can Reduce the Number or Limit the Scope of Climate-Engineering 
Patents Already Granted 
¶54  Patent thickets and anticommons both result from over-patenting. The USPTO has 
several tools at its disposal to address these problems. For instance, it can limit the 
number or scope of certain patents or simply block overly broad patent applications. At 
the extreme end of the spectrum, the USPTO could independently deny all climate-
engineering patent applications, or alternatively, Congress could prohibit the patenting of 
these inventions, both achieving the same result. And concerning patents already 
awarded, the USPTO can exercise its reexamination power, possibly limiting or revoking 
such patents where appropriate. Nevertheless, as an industry develops, one assumes the 
USPTO imposes stricter standards, perhaps even limiting the number of patents annually 
awarded in a newly established field.137 If recent trends are indicative,138 however, the 
USPTO’s permissive practices might endure longer than expected. 
¶55  Alternatively, Congress could force a resolution by prohibiting patents of climate-
engineering inventions. While this approach might seem drastic, the U.S. government has 
taken similar measures before to protect the public interest. For instance, federal law 
currently prohibits patents for inventions relating to national security139 or atomic 
energy.140 Pursuant to these statutes, if the Commissioner of Patents concludes that an 
 
climate-engineering products will likely be an intergovernmental agency. See also Paul Nightingale & Rose 
Cairns, The Security Implications of Geoengineering: Blame, Imposed Agreement and the Security of 
Critical Infrastructure 9–10 (CGG Working Papers, Paper No. 18, 2014), available at http://www.climate-
engineering.eu/single/items/nightingale-paul-cairns-rose-c-2014-the-security-implications-of-
geoengineering-blame-imposed-agreement-and-the-security-of-crit.html (arguing that, because of security 
concerns, SRM technologies would likely be operated by the military). 
134 See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 488 (Ct. Cl. 1933) (noting that the 
U.S. government threatened to condemn aviation patents to facilitate airplane manufacturing). 
135 BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 133, at i. 
136 The recent Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) Project was “one of the 
first large SRM research projects anywhere in the world, and the first to propose an outdoor experiment.” 
Jack Stilgoe, Matthew Watson & Kirsty Kuo, Public Engagement with Biotechnologies Offers Lessons for 
the Governance of Geoengineering Research and Beyond, PLOS BIOLOGY, Nov. 2013, at 1, 2. The 
experimenters cancelled the field-test over a patent dispute. Cressey, supra note 3, at 429. 
137 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1613. 
138 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2012, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). 
139 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).  
140 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2012). 
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application might involve such technologies, then she must submit the application to the 
appropriate agency for review.141 If the agency concludes that the application implicates 
these concerns, then the USPTO withholds the patent.142 The applicant, however, is 
entitled to reasonable compensation,143 determined by the Patent Compensation Board.144 
The Atomic Energy Act similarly bars patents for inventions that are “useful solely in the 
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.”145  
¶56  Climate change has national security implications.146 Because of the risks inherent 
in several geoengineering methods,147 many are unlikely to be used except in the event of 
a climate emergency. Thus, premising a reduction or even prohibition of climate-
engineering patents upon national security concerns could be justified. Furthermore, by 
definition, a prohibition on such patents would prevent the problems of thickets and 
anticommons from worsening, and remove barriers to future inventions.148  
¶57  Nevertheless, the disadvantages of such a ban outweigh its benefits. The outright 
prohibition of patents and their corresponding exclusivity rights would likely discourage 
research and investment in a fledgling field.149 And given that these inventions will likely 
have geoengineering and non-geoengineering uses,150 an inventor may circumvent this 
limitation by seeking patent protection for its other uses, while keeping silent about the 
climate-engineering aspects of the invention. Furthermore, prohibiting or denying patents 
for future inventions will not resolve the problems associated with current patents, 
specifically the difficulty of identifying and tracking geoengineering inventions and 
securing rights to the use thereof.  
¶58  Congress adopted a slightly different approach for inventions related to the space 
program. Inventions pertaining to space activities developed during employment or under 
contract for the U.S. government became the exclusive property of the United States,151 
ensuring that such inventions were available for this national purpose. Climate 
 
141 See 35 U.S.C. § 181. Specifically, the Commissioner shall provide the patent to the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or agency designated 
by the President as a defense agency of the United States. Id. 
142 S. Scott Pershern, Taking Inventors’ Lunch Money: Provide Incentives for Sensitive Technology 
Research Under the Patriot Act, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 697, 702 (2007). 
143 35 U.S.C. § 183 (2012). 
144 42 U.S.C. § 2187. 
145 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a). 
146 See CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2007). Among these 
concerns are food and water security, famine and food scarcity, health security, disruptive migration events, 
political instability, and international conflict. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: ANTICIPATING SURPRISES 146 (2013). 
147 For instance, most aerosol-based SRM methods would alter the globe’s precipitation patterns. John 
Latham et al., Marine Cloud Brightening, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4217, 4223 (2012). If 
SRM does cool the planet, the system could be turned off but only at a price—scientists have determined 
that the climate would return to its pre-cooled temperature, but the temperature would rise at such a rapid 
rate that it might endanger many species. Kelly E. McCusker et al., Rapid and Extensive Warming 
Following Cessation of Solar Radiation Management, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 24005, 24005 (2014). 
Similarly, CDR methods also involve risk. For example, stored carbon could escape and reenter the 
atmosphere. Bob van der Zwaan & Koen Smekens, CO2 Capture and Storage with Leakage in an Energy-
Climate Model, 14 ENV’T MODEL ASSESS. 135, 135 (2009).  
148 See Beldiman, supra note 104, at 49. 
149 See also id. 
150 See infra Part V.B. 
151 42 U.S.C. § 2457(a) (2006) (repealed 2010). 
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engineering not only shares many parallels with the space program, such as governmental 
involvement and national (indeed, global) benefit,152 but also is more urgent. Thus, a 
comparable provision asserting exclusive government control of such inventions, joined 
with broad or open licensing practices, could help eliminate the problems of thickets and 
anticommons. While this might be helpful, in light of the wide range of private industries 
currently involved in geoengineering research,153 this restriction would likely have 
limited impact. 
¶59  Alternatively, the USPTO could reexamine and, where appropriate, revoke or 
narrow previously issued patents. The Patent Statute authorizes any person at any time to 
file a request to reexamine any patent on the basis of prior art.154 Further, the America 
Invents Act (AIA) provides two new procedures for third parties to request patent 
review.155 The first procedure—post-grant review—enables a third party to challenge a 
patent on any ground of patentability within nine months of the granting of the patent.156 
After this nine-month period (or resolution of a post-grant review), the second procedure, 
called inter partes examination, allows anyone to request that one or more claims of a 
patent be deemed unpatentable.157 But despite these improvements, the new procedures 
likely provide inadequate remedies because filing for a patent reexamination is labor 
intensive and expensive.158 Simply stated, relying upon prospective inventors to reduce 
the thicket in this manner seems both misplaced and unrealistic. 
¶60  Perhaps more promising, the USPTO Director also possesses the power to initiate 
reexamination of a patent, either after request or upon the Director’s own initiative.159 A 
Director, however, rarely issues an order to commence reexamination.160 That said, one 
of the few instances of director-initiated reexamination addressed an analogous trend of 
granting overly broad patents in a fledgling and complex field. For an entire decade, the 
USPTO had denied all software patent applications. But in 1981, in Diamond v. Diehr, 
the Supreme Court held that software was patentable.161 As a result, and in part because 
of a lack of examiners possessing the necessary expertise, the USPTO began granting 
excessively broad software patents. After receiving much criticism for these broad 
patents, the Director initiated a reexamination, and ultimately, the agency rescinded 
dozens of these patents.162  
 
152 See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 133, at 36 (noting that because engineering the climate 
system is a global activity with trans-boundary effects, some suggest that only a multilateral body is 
appropriate in addressing it). 
153 Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71. 
154 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
155 Lanning, supra note 50, at 403.  
156 Id.  
157 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
158 See Stiles, supra note 92, at 570. While one analysis found reexamination costs total approximately 
one-tenth of the cost of litigation, they still could range as high as $100,000. Additional drawbacks are a 
limited role for the challenger during the reexamination process and probable juror bias against a party 
whose reexamination request failed. Stuart J. H. Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of 
U.S. Patent Reexaminations and European Patent Oppositions, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD 8 (Wesley M. 
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8807. 
159 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012). 
160 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2012). 
161 450 U.S. 175, 185–86 (1981). 
162 See Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE 
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¶61  Finally, and serving as the most extreme alternative procedure, Congress can 
simply revoke all geoengineering patents, as it did when enacting the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA). Congress passed the AEA to provide for government control of the possession, 
use, and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material, and to encourage 
widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes.163 To these ends, the law “revoked all existing patents useful exclusively in the 
production of fissionable materials.”164 While revocation, or “patent breaking,” would 
help reduce the number and breadth of climate-engineering patents, most commentators 
consider it an unpalatable option used only in dire circumstances.165 For this reason, 
compensation is available for any patent revoked under these provisions.166 In view of 
these considerations, namely the significant resources required and limited deterrent 
value for future patent applications, patent breaking probably provides only a remedy of 
last resort for dealing with these issues. 
C. Compulsory Licenses Can Ensure Access to These Inventions 
¶62  A similar yet less extreme option often suggested by commentators to improve 
access to patents is compulsory licensing. A compulsory license “compels a patent owner 
to allow certain others to practice the invention otherwise protected by a patent.”167 The 
government effectively steps into the shoes of the patent holder to grant a license to a 
government agency or third party. Usually, the patentee receives compensation for the 
compelled license.168  
¶63  The primary benefit of compulsory licenses is that they allow widespread access to 
inventions to facilitate further innovation.169 Specifically, compulsory licensing can be 
critical when the market has failed to disseminate inventions. This occurs when the patent 
owner exercises its monopoly power but chooses not to practice the invention or charges 
unreasonable prices for a license.170 Therefore, many argue that compulsory licensing 
may mitigate patent thickets171 and anticommons,172 both of which impair future 
inventors’ attempts to acquire the necessary licenses to continue innovation. Given that 
 
REVS. GENETICS 803, 805 (2002). 
163 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (2012). The legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act indicates that Congress 
concluded that the processing and use of fissionable material must be regulated to promote the national 
interest and to protect public health and safety. Michael Moulton, Effecting the Impossible: An Argument 
Against Tax Strategy Patents, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 665 (2008). 
164 N.V. Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 316 F.2d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
165 See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue: Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 309, 341 (2007) [hereinafter Torrance, Patents to the Rescue]. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 336. 
168 Id. 
169 See Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for a Limited 
Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 619 (2005). 
170 See Mandel, supra note 55, at 59. 
171 See, e.g., Richard Bis, Financing Innovation: A Project Finance Approach to Funding Patentable 
Innovation, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 20 (2009). 
172 See, e.g., Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case 
for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251 (2008). 
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these licenses are especially appropriate when the underlying invention has significant 
social value, at first blush, compulsory licensing appears to offer a possible solution.173  
¶64  Yet the U.S. patent system generally disfavors compulsory licenses. As the 
Supreme Court recognized, “Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system.”174 A 
broad grant of compulsory licenses has generally received a frigid reception from 
domestic parties, with U.S. courts and many commentators often “hostile to the very 
concept of compulsory licensing.”175 And although courts recognize compulsory 
licensing as a solution for antitrust violations,176 it is considered a remedy of last resort.177  
¶65  On only a few occasions, and none recently, courts have imposed compulsory 
licenses.178 In one case, the Second Circuit found a compulsory license appropriate 
primarily because the patent owner was not using the license to manufacture a product.179 
Subsequent decisions of the Federal Circuit, however, indicate that it is unlikely to award 
compulsory licenses in the future.180 Indeed, the Federal Circuit consistently posits that 
broad protection of patent rights conforms to public policy.181  
¶66  Despite this resistance, the use of compulsory licenses to resolve legal disputes has 
spawned some significant successes; the most prominent examples of which occurred 
over a half-century ago. In 1956, the United States entered into consent decrees with 
American Telegraph & Telephone (AT&T) and International Business Machines (IBM) 
concerning their patents. The agreement with AT&T required that it license at reasonable 
royalties all patents controlled by a subsidiary, Bell Systems.182 Similarly, the IBM 
decree required that it grant nonexclusive, nontransferable licenses for all of its patents to 
any applicant at reasonable royalties. Accordingly, the applicant was obligated to cross 
license its patents to IBM on similar terms.183 While some originally opposed this 
government involvement, in hindsight, the combined licensing of these patent portfolios 
is widely recognized for fostering the rapid growth of the semiconductor industry.184  
¶67  Nevertheless, Congress has repeatedly rejected invitations to enact a broad 
compulsory license statute. While the Patent Act does not contain a general compulsory 
 
173 Rose, supra note 169, at 621–22. 
174 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
175 Kimberly M. Thomas, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a Compulsory 
Licensing Provision in the Absence of an Experimental Use Exception, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 356 (2007). Indeed, a congressional representative once charged that compulsory 
licenses are both unconstitutional and un-American. Stefan A. Risenfeld, Compulsory Licenses and United 
States Industrial and Artistic Property Law, 47 CAL. L. REV. 51, 51–52 (1959). 
176 See United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 71 n.5 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
177 See Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzjia, Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable 
Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 509, 535–36 (2007). 
178 See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1281. 
179 Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974). 
180 See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1281. 
181 See Smith Int’l., Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against infringement as consistent with the public policy underlying the patent 
laws). 
182 TEECE, supra note 107, at 209. 
183 Id. at 211. 
184 See id. at 212–13. IBM noted that this relatively open licensing helped accelerate the pace of 
innovation because it facilitated the work of others and access to their results. In fact, IBM considered 
access to others’ patents to be more valuable than the royalties it could have earned on the licensing of its 
9,000 patents. Id. at 212. 
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licensing provision,185 during its 1952 revision of U.S. patent law, Congress considered 
incorporating a compulsory licensing provision. However, after vehement opposition, it 
excluded this provision from the final bill.186 A few years later, Congress reconsidered 
adding the provision, but again rejected it.187 Subsequent efforts to amend the Patent Act 
to allow compulsory licensing for public health purposes or special circumstances have 
also failed.188 With opposition still salient, the United States remains one of the few 
countries without a general compulsory license provision.189  
¶68  Nevertheless, in certain limited circumstances, inapplicable to the vast majority of 
patents,190 Congress has provided for the imposition of compulsory licenses.191 The most 
noteworthy examples, touched on before and discussed below, are the Atomic Energy 
Act and Clean Air Act. Other instances of limited compulsory licensing are found in the 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act (granting compulsory licenses for inventions related to 
fertilizer or hydroelectric power),192 the Plant Protection Act (granting compulsory 
licenses when necessary to provide an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed),193 and the 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (granting innocent purchaser of an infringing chip 
the right to pay a reasonable royalty).194  
¶69  The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) provides a form of compulsory license. Upon 
receipt of an application to practice a license, the Atomic Energy Commission will 
conduct a hearing to determine whether the patent implicates the public interest.195 That 
is, the public interest must be of primary importance to the utilization of fissionable 
material to effectuate the purposes of the AEA.196 Where the public-interest inquiry has 
been satisfied, the Commission may grant a nonexclusive license197 to either the 
government or a person seeking a license.198 If a person applies for a license, the 
applicant must demonstrate that he cannot receive a license from the patent holder for a 
 
185 Chui, supra note 49, at 462. 
186 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 n.21 (1980). 
187 Andrew W. Torrance, Patent Law, Hippo, and the Biodiversity Crisis, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 624, 648 (2010). 
188 Rose, supra note 169, at 621. Congress rejected compulsory license provisions in other legislation, 
including the 1973 Hart Bill and the 1999 Affordable Prescription Drugs Act. Yosick, supra note 70, at 
1278. The Hart Bill would have permitted compulsory licenses of patents related to “public health, safety, 
or protection of the environment” or for patents that are unused. Id. The Affordable Prescription Drugs Act 
would have required compulsory licenses of patents relating to human health under certain circumstances. 
Id. 
189 See Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT. 
RES. & ENVTL. L. 397, 404 (1994). 
190 See id. 
191 Despite their relative rarity in U.S. patent law, compulsory licenses are actually commonplace under 
U.S. copyright law. See Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid, 32 PACE L. 
REV. 641, 672 (2012). 
192 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2012). 
193 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012). 
194 17 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). 
195 42 U.S.C. § 2183(d) (2012). 
196 42 U.S.C. § 2183(a). 
197 42 U.S.C. § 2183(b).  
198 Id. 
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reasonable amount.199 The AEA correspondingly mandates that patent owners receive 
reasonable royalties from licensees.200 
¶70  Congress similarly included a compulsory license provision in the Clean Air Act 
(CAA), which places the primary responsibility for air-pollution prevention and control 
on the states.201 The CAA seeks to improve air quality through the implementation of a 
regulatory scheme designed to stimulate private development of air-pollution-control 
technology.202 Because of the importance of access to these technologies, Congress 
included a means for states to acquire compulsory licenses to technologies necessary to 
achieve federally mandated air-quality standards.203 If the state can satisfy a set of 
requirements,204 then the U.S. Attorney General certifies the application to a district 
court, which may order the patentee to license the invention upon reasonable terms.205 
While states have yet to employ this provision, one commentator suggests that its 
presence may have persuaded parties to negotiate agreements they might not otherwise 
have reached.206 
¶71  The U.S. government has also reserved the right to a compulsory license for any 
U.S. patent.207 When the United States uses or manufactures (or contracts with a party to 
do so) an invention protected by a U.S. patent, it acts not as an ordinary infringer but as a 
compulsory, nonexclusive licensee.208 Congress enacted this law to enable the federal 
government to purchase goods necessary to its performance without the threat of having 
the supplier enjoined from selling patented goods to the U.S. government.209 The United 
States’ right to compel a license applies broadly, and the federal government exercises 
this right frequently.210  
¶72  Additionally, although Congress has not approved a general compulsory license 
provision, it did provide the federal government broad licensing rights for government-
funded inventions. In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act (BDA), which amended 
the patent code.211 Prior to the passage of the BDA, the USPTO received very few 
applications for federally funded inventions, the majority of which remained in the hands 
 
199 42 U.S.C. § 2183(e)(4). 
200 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g). 
201 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2012). 
202 See Warren F. Schwartz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology, 57 VA. 
L. REV. 719, 719 (1971). 
203 Torrance, supra note 187, at 648–49.  
204 The Clean Air Act requires a party to satisfy three requirements to obtain a license. First, the patented 
technology is not “reasonably available” yet “necessary” to comply with an air-quality standard; second, 
“no reasonable alternative methods” exist; and third, the unavailability of such technology may cause a 
“substantial lessening of competition.” 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012). 
205 Id. Congress approved § 7608 with little controversy in 1970, Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 405–
06, but an effort arose subsequently to repeal the provision. Id. at 406 n.39. Nevertheless, by 1977, when 
Congress “completely revised” the Clean Air Act, the provision remained. Id. at 406. 
206 Yosick, supra note 70, at 1279. 
207 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).  
208 See Motorola, Inc. v. United States., 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The statute entitles the 
patent holder to a reasonable royalty. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Because the government has the right to use 
patented inventions for the public good, infringement by the government is treated as an exercise of 
eminent domain, rather than tortious conduct, as would be the case with private litigants. B.E. Meyers & 
Co. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 375, 380 (2000). 
209 See Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
210 See Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 403.  
211 Thomas, supra note 175, at 365. 
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of educational institutions.212 Congress approved the BDA to promote the utilization of 
inventions arising from federally funded research, to encourage small businesses’ 
participation in federally funded research, and to foster the collaboration of profit and 
nonprofit interests, especially universities.213 The BDA accomplished these goals by 
allowing universities to retain title to federally funded inventions.214  
¶73  This transfer of rights had a profound effect. Since 1980, the number of patents 
generated by domestic universities has increased tenfold.215 Additionally, university 
income from licensing increased from $7.3 million in 1981 to $3.4 billion in 2008.216 Yet 
universities were not the only benefactors. In exchange for allowing universities to retain 
title to their inventions, the BDA establishes “march-in rights” for federal agencies that 
fund these patented inventions. And because march-in rights allow funding agencies to 
grant licenses to qualified third parties,217 the private sector benefits as well. In essence, 
the BDA establishes compulsory licenses for those inventions that arise from federal 
funding.218  
¶74  Further, the U.S. government may exercise its march-in rights, inter alia, to 
alleviate health or safety needs.219 These rights, however, appear not to have been 
exercised in the three decades since Congress passed the law.220 Joshua Sarnoff suggests 
that the refusal to exercise these rights demonstrates their highly controversial nature, 
specifically in that they function as “ex post regulatory compulsory license[s].”221 Again, 
American antipathy to compulsory licensing proves persistent.  
 
212 Terry K. Tullis, Comment, Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded 
Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 279, 303–04 (2005). At the time, the government funded 60% of all academic research. Innovation’s 
Golden Goose, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1476653. Despite this 
investment, only 5% of federally funded inventions led to commercial applications. Tullis, supra at 304 
n.97.  
213 See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).  
214 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). The United States also retains a royalty-free license for it or any of its 
contractors to practice the invention. Id. § 202(c)(4). 
215 Id. § 202(a). 
216 See Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 45 LES NOUVELLES 185, 188 
(2010). 
217 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012). 
218 Thomas, supra note 175, at 366. 
219 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). Additional circumstances include overcoming a failure to apply the invention, 
§ 203(a)(1), meeting requirements of federal regulations for public use, § 203(a)(3), or addressing a breach 
of the agreement, § 203(a)(4). Administrative and federal court appeals processes further restrict these 
rights for adversely affected inventors and licensees. § 203(b). 
220 As of 1997, the United States had never utilized its march-in rights. Mary Eberle, March-In Rights 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
155, 160 n.38 (1999). For instance, as of 2012, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) had yet to grant a 
petition for a license. Kevin E. Noonan, Groups Petition for NIH Exercise of March-In Rights over Abbott 
Laboratories’ Norvir®, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/11/groups-petition-
for-nih-exercise-of-march-in-rights-over-abbott-laboratories-norvir.html. 
221 Sarnoff, supra note 130, at 355. Mr. Sarnoff believes that this resistance could be alleviated through 
greater clarity concerning the criteria and circumstances giving rise to the exercise of march-in rights. Id. A 
related approach that might better encourage the extension of licenses comes from California. In 2004, the 
Golden State’s voters approved the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative. Andrew T. Serafini 
& Gene H. Yee, IP Provisions and ROI for State-Funded Stem-Cell-Based Products and Technologies in 
California, 24 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (2012). It requires grantee organizations to negotiate non-
exclusive licenses of funded inventions “whenever possible.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100306(b) (2014). 
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¶75  International agreements and laws, on the other hand, typically support compulsory 
licenses dating back to the 1873 Vienna Congress.222 Currently, for example, the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) identifies several 
grounds for granting compulsory licenses, such as in response to national emergencies, 
anticompetitive practices, or unavailable necessary medicine.223 Further, both the Paris 
Convention and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also provide for 
the exercise of such licenses.224 Many nations have enacted compulsory license laws as 
well. For instance, when the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) surveyed 
its member states concerning their compulsory licensing provisions, twenty-two countries 
responded that they allow compulsory licenses for national or public interests,225 while 
twelve countries responded that they provide such licenses for public health reasons.226 
¶76  However, even countries with compulsory licensing provisions rarely implement 
them.227 More commonly, governments threaten to utilize their licenses, thus coercing 
patent holders to either grant licenses or make the products available at substantially 
lower prices. For instance, in 2001, Brazil announced its intent to grant a compulsory 
license to produce Nelfinavir, a retroviral drug used in the treatment of AIDS.228 Brazil 
planned to act under the “national emergency” provision of its patent law, which mirrors 
Article 31 of TRIPS.229 Less than two weeks after Brazil’s announcement, Hoffman-La 
Roche reduced the price of the drug by 40%.230 Thus, the true benefit of compulsory 
licenses may stem from the threat of potential licensing rather than the actual grant 
thereof, inspiring patent holders and potential licensees to negotiate agreements.231 While 
governments have used compulsory licensing infrequently, many proponents identify the 
coercive nonuse of compulsory licensing as its primary benefit. Referred to as a “wings 
effect,”232 the mere ability of the government to compel licenses can encourage patent 
holders and inventors to negotiate acceptable terms rather than risk governmental 
intervention.233 
¶77  Yet notwithstanding their realistically benign influence, critics attack compulsory 
licenses on several grounds.234 The primary criticism has been that these licenses reduce 
 
222 Thomas, supra note 175, at 359. 
223 Id. 
224 Torrance, supra note 187, at 648. 
225 Included within this category are national security, national defense, considerable public interests, 
protection of natural environment, etc. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., SURVEY ON COMPULSORY 
LICENSES GRANTED BY WIPO MEMBER STATES TO ADDRESS ANTI-COMPETITIVE USES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2011). The twenty-two countries were Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan. Id.  
226 Id. These countries are Belgium, France, Hungary, Kenya, Mexico, Lithuania, Oman, Panama, 
Poland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine. Id.  
227 See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1294. 
228 See Jason D. Ferrone, Compulsory Licensing During Public Health Crises: Bioterrorism’s Mark on 
Global Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 385, 402 (2003). 
229 Id. at 402–03. 
230 Alex Bellos, Roche Bows to Brazil on AIDS Drug, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 2001. 
231 Thomas, supra note 175, at 357–58. 
232 Rose, supra note 169, at 622. 
233 Id. 
234 At one extreme, critics charge that compulsory licenses represent “socialism in disguise.” Rose, 
supra note 169, at 623. 
Vol. 13:1] Anthony E. Chavez 
 27 
incentives to invent because they diminish the value of inventions by eliminating 
inventors’ opportunities to exercise monopoly pricing. The resulting lower return lessens 
the main incentive to invent.235 Moreover, fearing this potential loss of value, many 
inventors might avoid patenting their inventions, thus inhibiting the beneficial disclosure 
that an application requires.236 Finally, the reduced prices resulting from compulsory 
licenses would discourage research investment, further hindering opportunities for 
innovation.237 In other words, critics argue that compulsory licenses could undermine the 
primary objectives of the patent system.238  
¶78  Critics also charge that compulsory licenses reduce competition.239 Although 
theoretically possible, the actual use of these licenses has avoided this consequence. As 
noted previously, the U.S. government tends to use compulsory licenses sparingly, if at 
all.240 Further, some commentators suggest that compulsory licenses should only be used 
in circumstances where the patent owner is either not licensing the invention entirely or 
only in a limited manner.241 Thus, under current practices, any anticompetitive impact 
would likely be minimal.  
¶79  Compulsory licenses certainly could help address the problems developing with 
geoengineering patents. The general resistance to their use, however, favors relying 
primarily upon less disruptive measures. Perhaps, compulsory licenses might be most 
useful as sticks to encourage voluntary participation in a less severe manner. Patent pools 
provide precisely such a method. 
D. Patent Pools Allow the Retention of Rights and Provide Broader Access 
¶80  The conditions for a patent pool arise when two or more patent holders control 
related patents, but at least some manufacturers of the end-product do not possess 
licenses.242 Stated simply, a patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent 
holders to license their patent rights. The patent holders usually convey their rights to a 
single entity, such as a limited liability partnership or corporation, allowing persons 
interested in the patents to purchase licenses to the entity’s entire portfolio.243 Then, the 
pool allocates the license fees to the patent owners pursuant to a predetermined 
formula.244 Patent pools are typically voluntary organizations.245  
 
235 Mandel, supra note 55, at 60. 
236 Thomas, supra note 175, at 357. To avoid such concerns, Katherine Strandburg suggests that, after a 
patent is granted, a moratorium be imposed before a compulsory license can be exercised. Katherine J. 
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 
143 (2004).  
237 See Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 416–17. 
238 See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1292. 
239 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 175, at 357. 
240 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). 
241 See Mandel, supra note 55, at 59. 
242 Sovacool, supra note 48, at 433. 
243 Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 530. This structure is typical, especially of some of the 
more prominent patent pools discussed infra. In some instances, however, the patent owners merely license 
their patents to one another. Different forms may reflect the different goals of the pool, such as upstream 
research and development or downstream access. Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting 
Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. 
J. 291, 294–95 (2012). 
244 Cox, supra note 243, at 295. 
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¶81  Patent pools are especially helpful in addressing patent thickets, where separate 
patent holders own patents for individual, related components.246 Patent pools can also be 
effective in remedying patent anticommons.247 Broadly stated, a patent pool solves both 
the thicket and anticommons problems because it facilitates innovation by expanding the 
number of persons who can utilize patented subject matter.248 
¶82  One of the most prominent examples of a patent pool involved the early American 
aviation industry. Following their historic invention, the Wright brothers sought and 
received a broadly defined airplane patent.249 Subsequently, the founders of flight 
attempted to block nearly all airplanes as infringements upon their patent.250 Further 
exacerbating “a chaotic situation concerning the validity and ownership of important 
aeronautical patents,” various aircraft companies threatened competitors with patent 
infringement suits.251 Because of the years of protracted litigation, at the start of the First 
World War, the U.S. aviation industry had produced a fraction of the number of planes 
produced by either France or Germany.252  
¶83  Upon the United States’ entry into the war, the federal government chose to 
intervene, in part through the efforts of then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.253 The U.S. government faced difficulty fulfilling plane orders and, as the 
principal purchaser of aircraft, greatly suffered from increased prices. Airplanes required 
components covered by a number of patents, and manufacturers were afraid of possible 
infringement suits.254 To resolve this problem, the Manufacturers Aircraft Association 
(MAA) incorporated in 1917.255 Manufacturers of aircraft and related parts purchased a 
share of the association,256 enabling them to exercise licenses on key patents shared in the 
pool.257 This arrangement was so successful that, upon its expiration after the war, the 
War and Navy Departments negotiated a new agreement with the MAA.258 By the end of 
the 1920’s, the aviation industry, which had produced only 100 planes preceding the war, 
was manufacturing 7,500 planes annually.259  
 
245 See Contreras, supra note 191, at 674–75. 
246 Id. at 655. 
247 See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., USPTO, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4 (2000), available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/ 
patentpool.pdf . 
248 Lanning, supra note 50, at 412. Other recognized benefits include reducing licensing costs (including 
litigation) and managing and administering the agreement and parties. Cox, supra note 243, at 295. 
249 LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN 86–87 (2014). 
250 MATTHEW ALBRIGHT, PROFITS PENDING: HOW LIFE PATENTS REPRESENT THE BIGGEST SWINDLE OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY 145 (2004). 
251 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 483 (Ct. Cl. 1933). 
252 ALBRIGHT, supra note 250. At the commencement of hostilities, France had manufactured 2,000 
airplanes, Germany 1,000, and the United States fewer than 100. Id. 
253 Contreras, supra note 191, at 675 n.137. 
254 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 483. 
255 Id. at 486. Its founders modeled the MAA after a similar entity formed at the beginning of the 
century to address comparable issues concerning patents related to automobiles. ALBRIGHT, supra note 250, 
at 146. 
256 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 486. 
257 ALBRIGHT, supra note 250, at 146. The MAA enabled the Navy to avoid spending an appropriation 
of $1 million to purchase or condemn basic aeronautic patents. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 488. 
258 Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 502. 
259 ALBRIGHT, supra note 250, at 146.  
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¶84  Providing a more recent example, in 2009, UNITAID formed the Medicines Patent 
Pool (MPP) using the MAA as a model.260 Several countries established UNITAID to 
develop a financing mechanism providing regular, sustainable, and predictable long-term 
financing for drugs and diagnostics used to treat AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in 
developing countries.261 But while UNITAID created the MPP using the MAA as its 
guiding framework,262 the arrangements differ in significant ways. Most obviously, 
participation in the MPP is voluntary, whereas the MAA was not.263 Further, the MPP 
negotiates with generic-drug manufacturers for non-exclusive licenses,264 which extend to 
multiple uses (e.g., a drug typically used for HIV can also be produced to treat hepatitis 
B), but not to new uses.265 Finally, employing modern technology to its advantage, the 
MPP publishes on its website the names of relevant pharmaceutical companies that have 
or have not joined the pool.266  
¶85  Thus, while UNITAID used the MAA as a blueprint, the MPP’s structure was 
uniquely tailored not only to a specific field, but also to modern realities. These 
distinctions illustrate the utility and flexibility of patent pools in cultivating innovation 
though cooperation. From the consolidation of sewing-machine inventions in the mid-19th 
century267 to the standardization of modern radio and television,268 the past two centuries 
are replete with examples of patent pools enabling the development of critical 
technologies.269  
¶86  Patent pools provide myriad advantages. For instance, they help resolve problems 
arising from building-block patents. Typically, patent pools do this by providing 
economic incentives for holders of building-block or component patents to cooperate 
when developing end-products.270 This is what essentially transpired in the aviation 
industry during World War I.271 Patents on fundamental inventions coupled with a 
general unwillingness to license the inventions at reasonable rates paralyzed the aviation 
 
260 Cox, supra note 243, at 296.  
261 Jorge Bermudez & Ellen ‘t Hoen, The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative: Bringing Patents Together 
for the Common Good, 4 OPEN AIDS J. 37, 37 (2010). The MPP receives its financing from a tax on airline 
tickets established by the participating member countries. Id. 
262 See id. at 38. 
263 Cox, supra note 243, at 296. 
264 Id. at 296–97. 
265 Id. at 303–04. 
266 See JACQUES DE WERRA, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 233 
(2013). 
267 See DAVID SERAFINO, SURVEY OF PATENT POOLS DEMONSTRATES VARIETY OF PURPOSES AND 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 3 (2007). 
268 Mireles, supra note 67, at 220–21. The Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which combined 
several companies’ technologies, led to the standardizing of radio and television parts and transmissions. 
Prior to the formation of RCA, a number of separate entities held important patents, enabling them to block 
one another. Moreover, radio systems required several technologies, each of which involved multiple 
patents. Accordingly, the industry was deadlocked. Once again, the parties resolved their differences after 
prompting from the Navy Department. See TEECE, supra note 107, at 207. 
269 Contreras, supra note 191, at 674–75. Recent examples include patent pools formed for CDs, DVDs, 
Bluetooth, and MPEG. Id. 
270 Stiles, supra note 92, at 576. 
271 Although the MAA was technically a voluntary patent pool, many commentators consider it to have 
been a de facto mandatory patent pool. See Contreras, supra note 191, at 675 n.137. If necessary, the 
United States had contemplated exercising its eminent domain powers to acquire the necessary patents. 
SERAFINO, supra note 267, at 16. 
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industry. Establishing a patent pool through the MAA provided manufacturers with 
access to these inventions, enabling the production of airplanes at a greatly enhanced 
pace.272  
¶87  Another key advantage is that patent pools help reduce licensing-transaction costs. 
Patent pools minimize or avoid many costs of acquiring licenses. These avoided costs 
include patent searches and possible litigation expenses related to patent infringement 
actions.273 Pools also help minimize the effort required to address questionable patents, 
such as those that are either invalid or excessively vague.274 They provide even greater 
efficiencies when patents on complementary technologies are available through the 
pool.275 Patent pools can thus provide an efficient, “one-stop” shopping means for 
acquiring access to patents that are essential for a given technology.276  
¶88  Patent pools also have benefits over involuntary licenses and the effects thereof, 
such as those resulting from compulsory licensing schemes or litigation. Pools, unlike 
involuntary measures, derive their valuations and royalty prices from the consensus of 
persons involved in the industry. This increases the likelihood that they fairly reflect their 
market value.277  
¶89  The most common criticism of patent pools stems from their potentially 
anticompetitive impact. In the past, some have used patent pools to collude and fix 
prices.278 Consequently, federal regulators and courts historically have viewed patent 
pools with skepticism. In recent years, however, these critics have more readily 
acknowledged a patent pool’s ability to encourage innovation.279 Indeed, the joint 
guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice recognize that 
patent pools provide procompetitive benefits.280 Many commentators note that careful 
scrutiny of the pooling arrangement can minimize anticompetitive tendencies.281 
¶90  Patent pools can help address the thickets and anticommons developing with 
climate-engineering patents. Furthermore, a geoengineering pool is likely to avoid the 
resistance that more disruptive approaches, such as patent breaking or compulsory 
licenses, would engender. Similar to how patent pools played critical roles in making 
radio and airplane inventions available, patent pools can again help provide access to 
inventions that may play a crucial role in society’s future. 
 
272 CLARK ET AL., supra note 247, at 8. 
273 Id. 
274 Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 530. 
275 Stiles, supra note 92, at 587.  
276 CLARK ET AL., supra note 247, at 9. Patent pools also reduce the likelihood that, after licenses have 
been acquired on all but a few patents for a technology, the remaining patent holders can hold out to force 
above-market rates for their patents. Id.  
277 See Mireles, supra note 67, at 220. 
278 Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 530–31. 
279 Mireles, supra note 67, at 218. 
280 See id. at 219. 
281 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 247, at 10. They also note that some commentators have argued that 
patent pools can be used to shield invalid patents, thereby allowing the charging of royalties on patents that 
should be in the public domain. The authors also believe that this also should be avoidable through careful 
review of the pooling arrangement. Id. 
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V. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT CHANGES TO THE PATENT SYSTEM TO 
ADDRESS CLIMATE ENGINEERING 
¶91  Because of the rapid acceleration in geoengineering patents and the growing 
urgency of climate change, the United States needs to modify its patent system to 
facilitate these inventions. First, it should establish a separate process for consideration of 
these applications, including a process for expedited review. Second, to facilitate access 
to these patents, the U.S. government should encourage the establishment of a patent 
pool, which would provide limited licenses for climate-engineering innovation. The 
government should also be empowered to ensure that all essential patents join the pool. 
A. The United States Needs a Unique Patent Process for  
Climate-Engineering Inventions 
¶92  A patent system tailored for geoengineering patents must provide for quick review. 
Not only will this require an expedited-review mechanism, but it should also include 
separate application and review procedures for climate engineering. Specifically, the 
USPTO should establish a separate application process staffed by examiners specializing 
in geoengineering patents. Experience indicates that such procedures accelerate 
review.282 In addition, a separate process will help the USPTO develop sufficient 
expertise to analyze and resolve these applications. This is especially important because, 
unlike most industries, the geoengineering field resembles an umbrella, incorporating a 
number of diverse technologies under a common goal.283 Furthermore, future methods 
may be unforeseeable. Thus, the establishment of a separate office with a dedicated staff 
would facilitate the approval of related inventions and enable the staff to stay abreast of 
recent developments in the field. Finally, as examiners develop greater expertise, they are 
less likely to approve broadly defined patents, which would help mitigate problems 
associated with thickets and anticommons at their source. 
¶93  A separate process will also centralize information about geoengineering patents. 
Currently, applications do not need to identify their inventions as related to climate 
engineering. Consequently, searching for related patents is unduly time consuming.284 
Identifying geoengineering patent applications separately will facilitate both the 
examination process by the USPTO and their subsequent identification by third parties, 
such as future inventors and manufacturers.  
¶94  Recent evidence further supports the conclusion that, by establishing a separate 
application process, the USPTO can review applications more easily and expeditiously. 
 
282 See Deborah Behles, The New Race: Speeding up Climate Change Innovation, 11 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
1, 41 (2009). Ms. Behles points to the experience under the Orphan Drug Act. The Food and Drug 
Administration established the Office of Orphan Products Development to review applications and award 
orphan designations. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 
4 (2001), available at oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00380.pdf . The office has reduced the time 
required to designate a product by 40%. Id. at 10–11.  
283 Included under this heading are methods such as carbon capture and sequestration, ocean 
fertilization, aerosol injection, enhanced ocean circulation, cloud whitening, enhanced surface albedo, 
space mirrors, and others. BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 133, at 10–19. 
284 See Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 9. They reported that their search terms “generated unexpected 
noise” and the results were “diffuse.” Id. 
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In 2009, the USPTO initiated its Green Technology Pilot Program (GTPP).285 The 
program provided a means for green-technology patent applications to receive 
preferential consideration without needing to satisfy all of the accelerated-examination 
program’s requirements.286 While the GTPP ended in March 2012,287 subsequent analysis 
determined that the separate process used for that program did in fact facilitate expedited 
review.288 Accelerated consideration is critical for geoengineering patents because of the 
prolonged time required to research and test these technologies,289 especially given that 
climate change is already surpassing tipping points.290 For these reasons, geoengineering 
patents provide a more compelling case for expedited consideration than do patents in 
most other fields. 
¶95  As did the GTPP, this new climate-engineering program should attempt to limit 
burdens placed upon applicants. Analysis suggests that added burdens—such as prior-art 
searches—deter applicants from using the accelerated-examination procedures.291 Unlike 
the GTPP, however, this new program needs to provide expedited review throughout the 
application process. Stahl and Beshore found this approach to mesh successfully with the 
USPTO’s accelerated-examination process.292  
¶96  Additionally, a separate process would enable the USPTO to develop a public 
database of climate-engineering patents. Such a database could reduce transaction costs 
resulting from preparing applications and prior-art searches.293 It would also help other 
inventors, researchers, and the public stay informed of developments concerning these 
technologies. For instance, a similar database, GenBank, exists for genetic sequences.294 
The National Institutes of Health designed GenBank to provide the scientific community 
access to the most up-to-date DNA-sequence information.295 Similarly, a geoengineering 
database can facilitate access to information about climate-engineering patents. 
B. The United States Should Establish a Geoengineering Patent Pool to Facilitate 
Access to These Patents  
¶97  Besides modifying the application process, the United States needs to ensure access 
to climate-engineering inventions to spur innovation. To this end, it should facilitate the 
establishment of a patent pool, and encourage or compel inventors to join. Furthermore, 
 
285 Tran, supra note 66, at 526. The implementation of the GTPP followed the adoption of similar 
programs in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 525–26. 
286 Pilot Program for Green Techs Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,666 
(Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 8, 2009). Most importantly, the GTPP did not require the applicant to conduct a 
pre-examination search for prior art. Jay Hickey, Green Technology: An Alternative Path to Accelerated 
Patent Examination, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 145, 151 (2012). 
287 Tran, supra note 66, at 529–30. 
288 Id. at 530. 
289 See Mandel, supra note 55, at 61. 
290 See, e.g., Joughlin, Smith & Medley, supra note 14, at 738. 
291 See Tran, supra note 66, at 522–23. 
292 Lawrence A. Stahl & Seth E. Boeshore, Accelerating the Acquisition of an Enforceable Patent: 
Bypassing the PTO’s Backlog, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 5 (2011). 
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the United States should structure licenses for the pool’s patents to minimize costs to 
innovators. 
¶98  The patent system needs to provide inventors sufficient access to climate-
engineering patents. Following a model previously established to address the urgent need 
for patent-barrier elimination, the U.S. government can achieve this goal. Nearly one 
century ago, the United States used the urgency of a World War and the threat of 
compulsory licensing to break two patent logjams. This prodding resulted in the 
establishment of the MAA and RCA.296 Similarly, the United States should encourage the 
creation of a climate-engineering patent pool, which, for simplicity, this Article will refer 
to as “GeoPool.” 
¶99  GeoPool would present significant advantages over the current patent model and 
the various alternatives. Pools have previously helped break through barriers created by 
overlapping and diffuse patent distributions.297 The “one-stop shopping” opportunity that 
pools provide to innovators enables efficient and inexpensive access to patents,298 which 
facilitates fair licensing rates299 and spurs investment.300 Thus, by improving access and 
minimizing costs, pools can foster innovation301 and centralize information related to 
climate engineering and inventions. To accomplish this, GeoPool will need an 
administrator to determine which patents to include in the pool.302 This is especially 
important because of the breadth of technologies falling under the heading of climate 
engineering that continue to evolve,303 thus requiring the parameters of the pool to be 
interpreted flexibly.304 
¶100  Because of the likely variety of inventions included in this pool, measures should 
be included to minimize the royalties that prospective licensees must pay for access to 
only some of the pool’s patents. Specifically, GeoPool should utilize provisions that limit 
licensees’ costs. For instance, severable or unbundled licenses allow a party to obtain 
licenses to fewer than all of the patents in the pool.305 This is important since innovators 
rarely know in advance which rights will be essential in developing an invention.306 In 
addition, the inclusion of termination rights would allow pool members to terminate a 
license on one or more patents while retaining their rights to other licenses.307 Such rights 
help reduce licensing costs for technologies that become dead ends. In other words, 
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termination rights allow innovators to limit their investment in licenses that prove to be 
unproductive, thus encouraging innovator participation in the pool. 
¶101  In this same vein, GeoPool should require that participants provide only a field-of-
use license limited to geoengineering uses.308 This limited license would allow pool 
members to utilize the patent for climate-engineering purposes while enabling original 
patent holders to retain patent rights over non-geoengineering uses. Thus, original patent 
holders could still benefit from the ability to license and receive royalties for these other 
uses. Since many climate-engineering inventions may have other applications,309 this 
significantly eases the blow of losing royalties from geoengineering uses. 
¶102  Finally, following previous frameworks, the federal government should utilize a 
combination of “carrots” and “sticks” to ensure inclusion of essential patents. As with 
prior patent pools, membership in GeoPool should be voluntary, if possible. Hopefully, 
the access that membership in the pool allows to other technologies, much as IBM gained 
by licensing its patents, will provide a sufficient “carrot” to incentivize widespread 
membership.310 But just as the United States was one century ago, it must be willing to 
utilize some “sticks” to prod patent holders into joining GeoPool. For instance, for 
geoengineering patents that do not join the pool, the USPTO can reexamine the patent to 
determine whether to narrow or break it. Although patent breaking is an extreme, rarely 
utilized solution,311 as discussed previously, it is one of several tools available for the 
U.S. government to compel licenses, along with exercising its march-in rights for 
federally funded inventions.312 
¶103  Yet the most palatable “stick” in this scenario lies in compulsory licensing. 
Although the United States lacks a general compulsory license provision,313 the exercise 
of such a provision would be consistent with international agreements like TRIPS314 and 
NAFTA.315 These agreements allow compulsory licenses to be granted during national 
emergencies, or in the alternative, for public, noncommercial uses.316 However, in 
circumstances requiring urgent and coordinated action such as this, adding a provision to 
the Patent Act that allows private parties to practice a license in the public interest would 
be most beneficial, perhaps mirroring a similar provision in the Atomic Energy Act.317 
Ideally, the legislation would provide an expedited process whereby the USPTO could 
 
308 A “field-of-use” license permits licensees to use a patent but only for certain purposes. Mark R. 
Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts?: Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 105, 105 (2012). The Federal Circuit upheld such conditions of patent grants. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
309 The following provide a few examples: Patent 8,603,424 pertains to the development of formed 
building materials composed of sequestered carbon which can be used in construction processes; Patent 
8,507,253 provides for the development of photosynthetic organisms to be used in bioreactors both to 
sequester carbon and to generate fuel; Patent 6,045,089 pertains to a solar-powered airplane, one 
application of which is intended to be weather modification. 
310 See TEECE, supra note 107, at 212. 
311 Torrance, Patents to the Rescue, supra note 165, at 342. 
312 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012). 
313 Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 404. 
314 Thomas, supra note 175, at 359. 
315 Torrance, supra note 187, at 648. 
316 Thomas, supra note 175, at 359. 
317 See Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 538 (recommending that compulsory licenses be 
granted not as a matter of course but where public interest factors outweigh the patent holder’s property 
interest). 
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rule upon pertinent requests.318 Of course, should actual implementation of a method 
become necessary, the United States’ right to exercise a compulsory license over any 
patent it has authorized ensures that it can guarantee access to essential inventions.319 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶104  The geoengineering-patent land-grab has already begun. These technologies, 
however, may become critical to society’s response to climate change. Because of the 
importance of these technologies, the United States needs to ensure that these patents do 
not deter innovation or prevent these technologies from being available for 
implementation. Specifically, it should develop unique procedures to approve these 
applications and form a geoengineering patent pool that will facilitate both innovation 
and accessibility. 
 
318 In other contexts, commentators have suggested modifying the terms of patents to encourage or 
facilitate joining pools. For instance, Caitlin Lanning proposes conditioning the awarding of gene patents 
upon joining a gene patent pool. Lanning, supra note 50, at 413. Dana Beldiman, on the other hand, 
suggests imposing a default trigger that would impose a fixed royalty upon a patented invention for failure 
to join a pool for influenza medicines. Beldiman, supra note 104, at 59. While the Lanning proposal may 
be more drastic than would be necessary, the Beldiman default trigger may suggest an approach that is 
worthy of further consideration. Lanning also proposes shortening the exclusivity period for certain patents. 
Lanning, supra note 50, at 409–10. While Lanning’s proposal might be helpful, the establishment of a 
geoengineering patent pool should obviate the need for such a remedy. 
319 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012). 
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